

Comment on: Competition and Defaults in Online Search

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Remedies in Google-Android case

- EEA: default screen with Google and several others
 - Only on new phones
 - 2% market share decrease
 - “Mountain gave birth to a mouse”?
- Russia: default screen with Google and two locals
 - 7% market share decrease
- Turkey: elimination of restraints *vis a vis* OEMs
 - 12% market share decrease

What explains Turkey vs. Russia?

- Remedy design?
 - The harshest vertical restraint:
 - = excluding others from default screen
 - Turkey leaves room for unilateral OEM decision
 - How can Russian remedy be less effective?
- Public anti-Googleism antagonism?
 - December 2019: Google removes android/play store
 - Backlash?
 - Remedy: August-September 2019
 - Window for market share reduction: July 2019-January 2022
- Perhaps theoretically model de facto exclusivity

Turkey vs. Russia-implications

- Countries (somewhat) smaller can afford to fight?
 - “Chicken” game harmed Google’s revenue
 - Deter ex ante.

What explains EEA vs. Russia?

- EEA only slightly more effective if also existing phones
 - Too many options (at least in second round)?
 - Confuse consumers

Why Bing more successful in desktops?

- Bing's desktop market share not reflect effect on mobile-phones
- Not from its merits but from leverage from Windows?

Thank you!
