

Mandated data sharing in hybrid marketplaces

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Originality of the paper

Unified framework to study the welfare effects of mandated data sharing to third-party sellers on hybrid platforms

- Price discrimination
- Cost reduction

Platform's strategies : sets commission fees, can copy and compete

Comparison of different market structures

- Homogeneous goods vs. horizontal differentiation

Main results :

- Platform strategically loses competition, not be too aggressive
- Market structure matters in welfare effect of data sharing

Main assumptions

Very strong platform

- No competition between third-party sellers, only the platform can copy a technology and enter product market
- The platform owns data on willingness to pay on each market
- Data of the platform can increase efficiency of the production technology

Cost-reduction data advantage

- Similar to value-enhancing data advantage ?

Exogenous market structure

- Endogenous decision of the platform to differentiate or not ? In which case the platform is better off ?

Extension : platform competition

DMA : mandated data-sharing only for Gatekeepers

- How does it affect competition in the platform market with a smaller platform with no such data advantage ?
- Can competition mitigate the negative welfare effect of data-sharing ?

The Gatekeeper platform is preferred

- Possibility of multi-homing
- **Price discrimination** : most affected consumers might turn to the smaller platform where not possible to price-discriminate ?
- **Cost-reduction** : Can constrain the platform in raising the fee such that the most efficient sellers are not negatively affected ?