CRESSE 2020 Lawyers’ Course

“The Role of Economics in Competition Law and Practice”

Friday, June 26th – Monday, June 29th, 2020
Heraklion, Crete, Greece

Detailed Course Contents
(Minor changes on the timing of the sessions can be made at any time)

Lecturers (in alphabetical order):

Matthew Bennett (Vice President, Charles River Associates)
John Davies (Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon)
Amelia Fletcher (University of East Anglia)
Frederic Jenny (ESSEC Business School)
Yannis Katsoulacos (Athens University of Economics and Business)
William Kovacic (Director, Competition Law Center, The George Washington University)
Pierre Regibeau (Vice President, Charles River Associates)
Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics)
Thomas Ross (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia)
Maarten Pieter Schinkel (University of Amsterdam)
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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| **Friday, June 26th, 11:20 - 13:00** | **SESSION 1: The Role of Economics and Review of Fundamental Economic Concepts I**  
 by Prof. Thomas Ross (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia)  
The importance and effects of Competition Policy. Dimensions of competition - price, quality, variety, innovation. Types of competition - static vs. dynamic. Economic objectives of competition law. The use of the error-cost framework; the advantages (and disadvantages) of an economics-based approach. Demand, cost concepts, supply, profit maximisation. The notion of equilibrium. |
| **Friday, June 26th, 14:00 - 15:40** | **SESSION 2: Markets, Welfare and the Benefits of Competition**  
by Prof. Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics)  
| **Friday, June 26th, 16:00 - 17:40** | **SESSION 3: The Role of Economics and Review of Fundamental Economic Concepts II**  
by Prof. Thomas Ross (Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia)  
Types of markets: perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition, oligopoly. The Lerner index and the measurement of market power. The concept of market structure and its measurement. |
| **Friday, June 26th, 18:00 - 19:40** | **SESSION 4: Game Theory: Applications in Competition Policy**  
by Prof. Maarten Pieter Schinkel (University of Amsterdam)  
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<td>SESSION 5: Market Definition and Determinants of Market Power</td>
<td>Saturday, June 27th</td>
<td>09:00 - 10:40</td>
<td>The role of product and geographic market definition in the enforcement of competition law. Demand and supply substitution. The hypothetical monopoly test. Critical loss analysis. Shortcomings and fallacies. Legal definitions, concepts, basic economics of and measurement of “market power”. Factors that influence market power.</td>
<td>Prof. Yannis Katsoulacos (Athens University of Economics and Business)</td>
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<td>SESSIONS 6 AND 7: Assessment of Mergers</td>
<td>Saturday, June 27th</td>
<td>11:00 - 12:40 and 14:00 - 15:40</td>
<td>Horizontal Mergers: Legal and economic framework; unilateral effects; the role of diversion ratios; merger simulation models; upward pricing pressure (UPP); coordinated effects; analysis of efficiencies. Conglomerate and vertical mergers.</td>
<td>Dr. Matthew Bennett (Vice President, Charles River Associates)</td>
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<td>SESSION 8: Cartels and Other Coordinated Practices</td>
<td>Saturday, June 27th</td>
<td>16:00 - 17:40</td>
<td>Economic theory of collusion. Tacit collusion. Different forms of collusive practices including horizontal price fixing, horizontal market sharing, restrictions in production, collusive tendering, information exchanges, bid rigging. Structural factors conducive to coordinated conduct. Facilitating factors. Detecting and discouraging cartels. The role of leniency programs.</td>
<td>Prof. Maarten Pieter Schinkel (University of Amsterdam)</td>
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<td>SPECIAL KEYNOTE LAWYERS’ LECTURE</td>
<td>Saturday, June 27th</td>
<td>18:10 - 18:45</td>
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<td>Prof. Einer Elhauge (Harvard Law School)</td>
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<td><strong>SESSION 9: Assessment of Pricing Abuses by Dominant Firms</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sunday, June 28th, 08:30 - 10:10</td>
<td>by Prof. Frederic Jenny (ESSEC Business School)</td>
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<td>When does foreclosure lead to competitive harm?&lt;br&gt;Tests for unilateral anticompetitive abuse by dominant firms: predatory pricing, loyalty rebates, margin squeeze.</td>
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<td><strong>SESSION 10: Assessment of Non-Pricing Abuses by Dominant Firms</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sunday, June 28th, 10:20 - 12:00</td>
<td>by Prof. Amelia Fletcher (University of East Anglia)</td>
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<td>Refusal to sell; anticompetitive and pro-competitive exclusive dealing; anticompetitive and pro-competitive tying; bundling and bundled discounts.</td>
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<td><strong>SESSION 11: Assessing Economic Evidence in Courts</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sunday, June 28th, 13:40 - 15:20</td>
<td>by Prof. Frederic Jenny (ESSEC Business School)</td>
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<td>The session will cover three main issues: 1) the difference between the legal and the economic approach to law enforcement; 2) the different ways to improve the understanding of economics by judges and 3) The lessons from experience on how to present complex evidence in courts.</td>
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<td><strong>SESSION 12: The Economics of Exploitative Abuses</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sunday, June 28th, 15:40 - 17:20</td>
<td>by Dr. John Davies (Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon)</td>
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<td>Excessive prices, market power and consumer welfare. Risks of intervention. United Brands: (a) price-cost tests and (b) ‘unfair’ prices. Economic measures of costs and profit. Economic value. ‘Unfair when compared with other products’ - price benchmarks. ‘Unfair in itself’? Relationship with other abuses.</td>
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<td><strong>SESSION 13: The Implications for Competition Policy of Behavioral Economics</strong>&lt;br&gt;Sunday, June 28th, 17:40 - 18:40</td>
<td>by Prof. William Kovacic (Director, Competition Law Center, The George Washington University)</td>
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<td>The session examines a significant new development in competition policy. It considers the role that behavioural economics is already playing, and how this might be expected to develop going forward.</td>
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SESSIONS 14 AND 15: The Economics of Inter-firm Vertical Agreements - Vertical Restraints in Practice
by Prof. Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics)

Categorisation of vertical restraints, economic effects of vertical restraints. Vertical coordination: double marginalisation, retail services, marketing, quality, reputation, free-riding. Competition dampening: how can vertical restraints be used to soften competition among rival structures. Facilitating practices: how can vertical restraints be used to facilitate collusion.

SESSION 16: Antitrust and Intellectual Property
by Prof. Pierre Regibeau (Vice President, Charles River Associates)

Economics of intellectual property rights. Conflicts between objectives of antitrust and IP and role of IP in antitrust. Licensing practises under articles 101 and 102. Agreements among groups of IP owners; standard setting; patent pools (are the effects of agreements different when IP is involved from their effects in ordinary markets?)
Abusive licensing by a single dominant IP owner.