Comments on “Standard of Proof for Collusion: Lessons Learned from an Antitrust Case in Russia,” by Shastitko and Golovanova

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DICE

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Topic and research question

Antitrust case in Large Diameter Pipes (LDP) market: One of these "industries that researchers know extremely little about, despite their importance to the Russian economy" (p. 3).

Paper aims at presenting "proofs" of non-collusive behavior, based on public documents. No model, no data.

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Main claim: No collusive agreement in LDP market, but facts (mostly) explained by risk and uncertainty.
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Comments - Case and writing
Specific details about the case could be framed more explicitly.

- Types of governance mechanisms (p. 7),
- Indicative planning instrument (p. 14),
- Overall: market specificities.
Emphasis on planning investment:
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- Parallel to MTR in telecoms: “countervailing force creates obstacles for qualifying the dominant positions ” (p. 9) – wise example?